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Abstract 
This paper examines the extent to which monetary policy is manipulated for political purposes 
by testing for the presence of political monetary cycles between 1972 and 2001.  This is the first 
study of its kind to include not only advanced countries but also a large sample of developing 
nations where these cycles are more likely to exist.  We estimate panel regressions of a monetary 
policy indicator on an election dummy and control variables.  We do not find evidence of 
political monetary cycles in advanced countries but find strong evidence in developing nations.  
Based on our results, we construct a new de facto ranking of central bank independence derived 
from the extent to which monetary policy varies with the election cycle.  Our ranking of CBI is 
therefore based on the behavior of central banks during election cycles when their independence 
is likely to be challenged or their lack of independence is likely to be revealed.  The ranking also 
avoids well-known problems with existing measures of central bank independence. 
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1. Introduction 
 This paper investigates the extent to which monetary policy is manipulated for political 
purposes during election periods.  In the political business cycle model of Nordhaus (1975), 
opportunistic politicians attempt to lower the unemployment rate before elections to increase 
their chances of reelection.  Implicit in this idea is first, that macroeconomic policy is not neutral 
(at least in the short-run) and therefore can alter economic outcomes; second, economic 
outcomes are important determinants of voter behavior; and third, politicians are opportunistic 
and attempt to exploit this short-run non-neutrality of macroeconomic policy for their own 
benefit by trying to achieve favorable economic conditions prior to elections.  Each of these 
issues has been explored in the literature.1 
In this paper, we concentrate on the third issue, in particular the presence of political 
monetary cycles, where there is a lack of consistent evidence.  Most existing research on this 
issue regresses a monetary policy instrument or inflation on an election cycle variable, which is 
used to test whether policy is significantly different near elections.  Using this approach, Alesina 
and Roubini (1992), Beck (1987), Golden and Poterba (1980), and Leertouwer and Maier (2001) 
find no evidence of political monetary cycles, in contrast to Boschen and Weise (2003), Grier 
(1987), and Haynes and Stone (1989).  Abrams and Iossifov (2005) find that Fed policy turns 
significantly more expansionary in the seven quarters prior to the election, but only when the Fed 
chair and incumbent presidential party have partisan affiliations.  
                                                 
1 On the issue of effectiveness of policy, Lucas (1972), Sargent (1973), Sargent and Wallace (1975), and McCallum 
(1978) argue that rational expectations on the part of agents preclude the existence of non-neutrality of policy, in 
particular monetary policy.  Subsequent models with asymmetric information [c.f. Cukierman and Meltzer (1986)] 
and nominal rigidities [c.f. Fischer (1977), Phelps and Taylor (1977)] show that monetary policy can have real 
effects in the short-run.  Rational expectations models therefore reduce the effect of policy on economic outcomes 
and therefore the incentives for political manipulation prior to elections, while not completely eliminating them.  
The second issue is whether the economic situation in a country has a significant impact on the outcome of 
elections.  Fair, in a series of papers, has found evidence that the voting behavior in the U.S. is in general responsive 
to economic conditions [c.f. Fair (1978, 1982, 1987)].  
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The conflicting evidence for the presence of political monetary cycles may result from 
the literature’s concentration on the U.S. and OECD countries.  In this paper, we use a sample of 
115 countries that also includes developing nations where these cycles are more likely to exist.  
We find that political monetary cycles are prevalent in developing countries but not in advanced 
economies.  We conjecture that this result is in large part due to differences in the degree of 
central bank independence (CBI).  Less independent central banks are more vulnerable to 
pressure from politicians to stimulate the economy before elections or to finance election-related 
increases in government spending.2  
Based on this premise, we propose a new de facto ranking of CBI derived from the extent 
to which monetary policy is significantly more expansionary near elections.  Measuring CBI is 
inherently difficult.  First and foremost, it is unobservable.  Secondly, it is difficult to infer the 
effect that politicians have on monetary policy because many factors determine policy.  Some are 
observable and can be controlled for, such as GDP growth; countries that grow faster can 
accommodate higher money growth without generating higher inflation.  Other factors, however, 
are unobservable (or difficult to measure) and can therefore be confounded with CBI.  For 
example, a dependent central bank could still display a strong aversion to inflation on average if 
there is a developed tax collection system that lowers the need for seigniorage revenue.  
Similarly, countries with dependent central banks could conceivably experience lower average 
inflation rates than those with independent central banks if their central bankers are more 
competent.  Measuring relative CBI based on cross-country differences in average inflation or 
money growth rates would therefore be problematic, even though cross-country differences in 
average inflation rates are partly due to differences in CBI.   
                                                 
2 Rogoff (1990) presents a theoretical model of political budget cycles.  Haynes and Stone (1988) find empirical 
evidence of political cycles in fiscal policy for the U.S.   
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We search instead for within-country variation in monetary policy that can be attributed 
to CBI and then rank CBI accordingly.  We propose election cycles as a source of this variation.  
During election cycles, politicians may place extra pressure on the central bank to produce 
seigniorage revenue or to expand the economy.  Meanwhile, unobservable factors such as the 
ability to collect taxes or the competence of central bankers are likely to remain constant.  It is 
therefore possible to isolate the impact of CBI on monetary policy.  We then rank CBI by 
election-induced, within-country differences in money growth rates. 
 One potential problem with assessing the level of CBI based on election cycles is that 
more autocratic regimes could control the central bank while not necessarily feeling the need to 
influence monetary policy before elections.  To address this issue, we only consider competitive 
elections and interact the election cycle variable with a measure of democracy.  We also take into 
consideration the exchange rate regime since fixed exchange rates limit the use of election-
related monetary expansion even if the central bank is not independent.   
Our ranking avoids the major problems with existing measures of CBI.  For example, 
many previous rankings are based on legal measures of independence from the fiscal authorities 
[c.f. Bade and Parkin (1977), Cukierman, et al. (1992), Eijffinger and Schaling (1993), Grilli, et 
al. (1991), Jácome and Vázquez (2005), Arnone, et al. (2007)].3  As the authors themselves 
recognize, these rankings may be problematic because what is written down in law can be vastly 
different from actual practice.4  In light of this problem, the literature has also considered de 
facto measures of independence.  For example, Cukierman, et al. (1992) rank independence 
                                                 
3 For a thorough review of the literature on measures of central bank independence, see Arnone, et al. (2006).  
4 For example, as described in Mishkin (2004), “Legally, the central bank of Canada does not look all that 
independent because the government has the ultimate responsibility for the conduct of monetary policy… in practice 
the Bank of Canada is highly independent.  In contrast, the central bank of Argentina was highly independent from a 
legal perspective.  However, this did not stop the Argentine government from forcing the resignation of the highly 
respected president of the central bank Pedro Pou in April of 2001 and his replacement with a president who would 
do the government's bidding.” 
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using the average turnover rate of central bank governors.  One problem with this measure, 
however, is that central banks that are not independent could still display little turnover since the 
central bank governor knows that he/she may be forced to resign if he/she acts independently.  
Subservient governors will therefore exhibit lower turnover.  Cukierman, et al. (1992) also 
introduce a second de facto measure based on responses from central banks to a questionnaire 
focusing on central bank practices.  The main drawbacks of this measure are that the responses 
may be biased and the sample size is quite limited.  Eijffinger, et al. (1996) construct a ranking 
only for OECD countries based on the coefficient of inflation in the central banks’ reaction 
function.  A possible problem with their method, however, is that dependent central banks could 
still be hawkish towards inflation most of the time, except perhaps during election years.    
Finally, we compare our CBI ranking with the ranking presented in Cukierman, et al. 
(1992) and find a high correlation between the two.  Using our ranking, we also confirm previous 
results that countries with more independent central banks have lower inflation rates in general 
and not only near elections [c.f. Cukierman, et al. (1992), Alesina and Summers (1993), Grilli, et 
al. (1991)].   A likely explanation for this result is that independent central banks are more 
immune from political pressure to finance government spending or stimulate the economy and 
can build a reputation for credibility, thereby reducing the time-inconsistency problem.5  Our 
results thus add support to claims of the importance of CBI.    
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows:  Section 2 describes the empirical 
methodology and the data.  Section 3 discusses the results.  Section 4 introduces our new ranking 
of CBI.  Section 5 concludes.   
 
                                                 
5 See Kydland and Prescott (1977), Calvo (1978) and Barro and Gordon (1983) on the time-inconsistency problem 
and Blinder (1998) and Mishkin and Westelius (2006) on the importance of central bank independence in reducing 
this problem.    
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2. Empirical Methodology and Data  
 In this section, we test for the presence of political monetary cycles by estimating a series 
of panel regressions of a monetary policy indicator, M, on its own lags, an election cycle dummy, 
EC, and control variables using quarterly data for the years 1972 to 2001:  
                       , , , , ,
1
K
i t i t k i t k i t i t
k
M EC M Controlsα β γ ε−
=
= + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ +∑ δ                        (1) 
where i indexes country and t indexes time.  In section 4, we allow the coefficient of EC to vary 
by country and use these coefficients to generate our ranking of CBI.  The sample includes 115 
countries for which all necessary data were available.6  The starting point for our sample, 1972, 
coincides with the earliest year for which there is data available on the Freedom House 
democracy indicators.  The fixed exchange rate regime indicator is available until 2001, which 
defines the end point of the sample.   
 
2.1 Monetary Policy Variable 
 We use the percentage growth rate of M1 over the last four quarters as the monetary 
policy indicator.  The quarterly data are from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS).  
We do not use inflation as our monetary indicator since it is not a policy instrument per se and is 
less directly controlled by the central bank.  While the monetary base is under direct control, data 
for most countries were unavailable.  We also do not use the money market interest rate due to 
missing quarterly data for many countries.  
 Lags of the dependent variable proxy for possible omitted variables, capture the inherent 
smoothing employed in the monetary policy process, and reduce the presence of autocorrelated 
                                                 
6 See the appendix for a list of countries and data sources.  Note that data on money growth for individual countries 
in the European Monetary Union do not exist after the formal adoption of the Euro.    
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error terms.  To select the number of lags, we estimate a series of regressions of M1 growth on 
its own lags and pick the specification that minimizes the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC).  
Based on this criterion, we use eight lags of M1 growth in each of our regressions. 
  
2.2 Election Cycle Variable 
 We constructed a large database of quarterly data on the date of elections for the national 
leader (the president in a presidential system and the prime-minister in a parliamentary system). 
Our main source was the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 
(International IDEA) whose Voter Turnout Database lists the years of parliamentary and 
presidential elections for 185 countries.7  The main criterion for including an election in their 
sample is that “there was a degree of competitiveness (that is, more than one party contested the 
elections, or one party and independents contested the elections, or the election was only 
contested by independent candidates)”.   We complemented this dataset with information from 
other sources to determine the quarter of elections.   
 The raw election quarter data were then used to construct four election cycle indicator 
variables.  EC1 is a dummy variable which takes on the value one for the four quarters prior to 
elections, the quarter of elections, and the four quarters following elections.  Similarly, EC2 is a 
dummy variable which takes on the value one for the eight quarters prior to elections, the quarter 
of elections, and the four quarters following elections.  In both EC1 and EC2, the four quarters 
following an election were considered to be part of an election cycle to account for possible 
smoothing of money growth by the central bank or for possible post-election monetization of 
pre-election short-term debt.  EC3 and EC4 are identical to EC1 and EC2 respectively, except 
                                                 
7 This database can be found at http://www.idea.int/vt/country_view.cfm?CountryCode=PK . 
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that they exclude the four quarters after elections.  A positive coefficient for the EC variable (in 
the absence of interaction terms) would indicate the presence of political monetary cycles.   
 
 
2.3 Control Variables 
 As control variables and/or interaction terms with EC, we include a dummy indicating 
whether the country is a developing economy (DEV), an exchange rate regime indicator (FXR), 
growth of real GDP (GROWTH), government consumption expenditure as a share of GDP 
(GOVEXP), and a democracy index (DEM).     
 The dummy variable DEV takes on the value one if the country is classified as either an 
emerging or developing economy in Arnone, et al. (2007).  We expect a positive coefficient on 
this variable indicating that developing economies on average have higher rates of money growth 
(unrelated to the election cycle).  This may be due to faster GDP growth in these countries, 
greater need for seigniorage revenue due to underdeveloped tax collection mechanisms, or less 
CBI.  We also interact DEV with EC to allow for the effect of elections to differ between 
advanced and developing countries.  We expect the sign of this interaction term to be positive, 
reflecting more severe political monetary cycles in developing economies as a result of lower 
CBI, for example.     
 FXR is a dummy variable based on the Reinhart and Rogoff (2001) exchange rate regime 
indicator and takes on the value one when there is a fixed exchange rate and zero otherwise.  A 
fixed exchange rate regime reduces the scope for independent monetary policy, and hence we 
expect the sign of FXR to be negative.  We follow Clark, et al. (1998) and Leertouwer, et al. 
(2001) and also include the interaction term EC* FXR as a regressor.  Since fixed exchange rate 
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regimes should also reduce the likelihood of observing a political monetary cycle, we expect the 
sign of this interaction term to be negative as well. 
 We use the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) dataset for GOVEXP 
and GROWTH.  Quarterly data are available from the IFS, but only for 30 countries, most of 
which are advanced economies.  Therefore, we use annual data from the WDI and assign each 
year’s value to every quarter in that year.  This increases the sample size to 115 countries.  We 
expect a positive coefficient on GOVEXP since higher government expenditure may translate 
into higher monetization of government debt.  In addition, a central bank that maintains an 
interest rate target could find itself accommodating a fiscal expansion, resulting in higher money 
growth [Beck (1987)].  Omitting the GOVEXP variable could bias the coefficient of EC because 
fiscal policy is positively correlated with the election cycle.  On the one hand, if the central bank 
accommodates an election-induced fiscal expansion, there would be an upward bias on EC.  On 
the other hand, if it tries to offset the fiscal expansion by lowering the rate of money growth, 
there would be a downward bias.  We also include GOVEXP as an interaction term with EC 
since the central bank may respond differently to fiscal expansions depending on whether it is an 
election period or not.  For example, it may offset fiscal expansions during off-election periods 
but accommodate them during election cycles.  This implies a negative coefficient on the 
interaction term.  However, if politicians choose to expand the economy during election periods 
through government spending, they may not feel the need to pressure the central bank to 
stimulate the economy, implying a negative coefficient.  Thus the sign of the interaction term is 
ambiguous.     
 GROWTH is the annual growth rate of real GDP.  The sign of GROWTH could be 
positive as high growth economies can accommodate higher liquidity without necessarily 
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creating higher inflation.  However, higher growth may generate inflation concerns and therefore 
lead to lower money growth rates.  Omitting the GROWTH variable can bias the coefficient of 
EC since the timing of elections is not necessarily exogenous.  In most parliamentary 
democracies, elections can be called at any time prior to the usual schedule, and it is plausible 
that this is more likely to occur when the economy is doing well.  On the other hand, elections 
may be called when there is a financial crisis due to pressure from opposition parties or a 
possible breakup of a coalition government.8  We also add an interaction term of GDP growth 
with the election cycle dummy with an expected negative sign since opportunistic money growth 
may be less needed when the economy is already doing well.      
 For the democracy index variable DEM, we use an average of the Political Rights (PR) 
and the Civil Liberties (CL) indexes from Freedom House.9  We include DEM in our regression 
as an interaction term with EC to control for the fact that more autocratic regimes have greater 
power to intervene during election periods, yet have less need to intervene since election 
outcomes may be manipulated in other ways.10  This implies that the sign of this interaction term 
is ambiguous.  In addition, by using the International IDEA database, which only considers 
elections for which there was a “degree of competitiveness,” we address the problem that 
autocrats might not need to pressure dependent central banks during elections.  As a robustness 
test in section 3.1, we also exclude elections that are listed as “not free” in IDEA International, a 
more binding restriction than requiring a “degree of competitiveness”.    
  
                                                 
8 If we restrict the sample to presidential elections to avoid endogeneity of election timing, then the sample becomes 
too small to obtain reliable estimates.  Therefore we include both presidential and parliamentary elections. 
9 The PR and CL indexes range from 1 to 7 with lower values indicating more democratic regimes.  We invert the 
indexes so that 1 represents the lowest level of democracy and 7 the highest.   
10 We do not include DEM as a control variable since it is not clear why the level of democracy should have an 
independent effect on money growth, and in fact it does not.  Moreover, adding DEM as a control variable does not 
affect results for the other variables.   
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2.4 Summary Statistics 
 Summary statistics for the data are provided in Table 1.  The sample period is 1972-2001 
and includes 115 countries (of which 25 are advanced economies and 90 are developing 
countries).  Advanced countries comprise 25% of all observations.  There are 503 elections in the 
sample, 187 of which took place in advanced economies.11  Of all advanced country 
observations, 63% have a democracy index of 7 (the highest level), and advanced countries make 
up 89% of all observations with a democracy index reading of 7.12  Advanced countries had a 
fixed exchange rate regime in 20% of all periods compared to 36% for developing economies.  
The mean government expenditure to GDP ratios in advanced and developing countries are equal 
to 0.18 and 0.15 respectively.  Finally, the mean growth rate in advanced economies is equal to 
3.3% as opposed to 3.5% in developing economies. 
 Table 1a presents summary statistics during election cycles and non-election periods 
using EC1 as the election cycle indicator.  In advanced economies, the mean growth rate of 
money supply does not differ considerably in election cycles vs. non-election periods and is 
approximately 12% in both periods.  In developing economies, however, the mean growth rate of 
money supply in election cycles is close to 80% compared to 30% during non-election periods.  
Coupled with the fact that the mean values for the control variables are roughly the same in 
election vs. non-election periods for both advanced and developing countries, this suggests the 
presence of political monetary cycles in developing economies, but not in advanced countries.  
                                                 
11 Note that the election cycle variables EC1, EC2, EC3 and EC4 all contain the same number of elections.  In 
principle, if all elections were at least three years apart, the number of elections would equal the total number of 
ones in each dummy variable divided by the number of ones for a single election cycle (e.g. nine for EC1).  There 
are some elections in the sample, however, which were held in close proximity to each other and therefore that 
calculation does not hold exactly.     
12 Note that DEV and DEM have a correlation coefficient of -0.57.  
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However, not all developing countries are prone to political monetary cycles since the median 
money growth rates are almost identical in election vs. non-election periods.  
 
 
3. Results  
 
 We estimated equation (1) by pooled OLS and fixed-effects (FE) estimation using three 
specifications.  In Tables 2 and 3, we report results from the regressions using EC1 and EC2 as 
the election cycle indicator variable respectively.  All specifications include eight lags of M1 
growth, the coefficients of which are not shown.   
 In specifications (1) and (2), where no interaction terms with EC are included, the 
coefficient of EC is positive and in general highly significant, providing evidence for the 
existence of political monetary cycles.  The coefficient varies from approximately 16 to 25 
percentage points, implying a large increase in money growth during election cycles.  The 
coefficients of the control variables themselves, by and large, have the expected signs in 
specification (2).  The coefficient of DEV has the expected positive sign (roughly 12.5 
percentage points) and is significant, implying that money growth in developing countries is 
considerably higher than in advanced economies.  The coefficient of FXR is mostly negative as 
expected but not significant.  The insignificance may be a sign of the frequent inability of fixed 
exchange rates to serve as effective nominal anchors.  The coefficient of GOVEXP is positive as 
expected for FE estimation, negative for pooled OLS, and insignificant for both cases.  The 
coefficient of GROWTH is significant and implies that a one percentage point increase in GDP 
growth leads to a 1.3 percentage point decrease in money growth.   
 In specification (3), we also include interaction terms of EC with the control variables.  
Note that in these specifications, the coefficient of EC by itself can be negative and significant.  
This is due to the fact that the interaction terms pick up most of the effect of the election cycle on 
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money growth.  Thus a negative coefficient on EC should not be interpreted as evidence for 
lower money growth during election cycles since we need to consider the coefficients for the 
interaction terms. 
 The coefficient of EC*DEV is positive and significant, implying that developing nations 
experience more severe political monetary cycles.  In particular, during election cycles, M1 
growth increases by 32 to 53 percentage points more in developing nations relative to advanced 
economies, all else equal.  Note that the results for EC2 are slightly weaker due to the fact that 
we are considering two years prior to the election dates, and it is plausible that some election-
induced monetary expansions were not initiated so far in advance.  Another potential explanation 
is that in parliamentary systems, early elections can be called and are usually held within a year.   
Based on the coefficients and the mean values of the variables in specification (3), M1 
growth for the typical economy is approximately 17.6 percentage points greater during elections 
relative to non-election periods using EC1 as the election variable.  For the typical advanced 
economy, M1 growth is approximately 1.9 percentage points lower during elections relative to 
non-election periods.  For the typical developing economy, M1 growth is 24.3 percentage points 
greater.  Thus we do not find evidence of political monetary cycles in advanced countries.  
However, we do find strong evidence of political manipulation of monetary policy in less 
advanced economies.    
The coefficient for EC*DEM is positive and significant.  This suggests that the need for 
politicians to win elections in democracies, as opposed to autocracies, leads to higher money 
growth and therefore more severe political monetary cycles.  The size of the coefficient implies 
that, all else equal, countries with the highest level of democracy (7 on a scale from 1 to 7) 
experience money growth rates that range from approximately 28 to 62 percentage points more 
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than those with the lowest level of democracy.  The coefficient for EC*FXR is not significant, 
suggesting that once other factors are controlled for, fixed exchange rate regimes do not reduce 
the presence of political monetary cycles.  The coefficient of EC*GOVEXP is mostly negative 
and always insignificant, suggesting that the two competing effects may cancel each other.  
Finally, the coefficient of EC*GROWTH is negative and significant, confirming our intuition that 
election related monetary expansion is less needed when the economy is performing well.  
Specifically, during election cycles, a one percentage point increase in GDP growth leads to a 4.7 
to 6.4 percentage point reduction in money growth rates, all else equal.    
 In Tables 4 and 5, we report results from the regressions using EC3 and EC4, both of 
which exclude the four quarters following elections, as the election cycle indicator variable 
respectively.  The results are similar, but somewhat weaker.  This is not surprising since an 
election cycle should also include several quarters after an election.  As pointed out above, this is 
due to the fact that central banks may smooth money growth by slowly reducing it to regular 
levels after elections, or choose to monetize election-related short-term debt after elections rather 
than before.  Finally, including eight quarters before an election weakens the results somewhat.     
 
3.1 Robustness Tests  
 We conduct several tests to check the robustness of our results.  First, we replicate Table 
2 using only post-1973 data to abstract from the fixed-exchange rate regime employed under the 
Bretton-Woods system.  The results of these regressions are very similar to the ones that were 
obtained using the whole sample period.   
 Second, we include the overall CBI index from Cukierman, et al. (1992), which is 
constructed from their measures of central bank governor turnover and legal measures of 
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independence, as an additional control variable (CBI) and as an interaction term with EC.  We 
use this variable, available only for the 1980’s, for our entire sample yielding one observation 
per country.  Lower values of CBI correspond to greater independence.  We therefore expect a 
positive sign on the coefficients of CBI and its interaction term.  Since the inclusion of this 
variable reduces the sample size to 60 countries, we re-estimate specifications (2) and (3) using 
only those countries and then compare the results when CBI is included (specifications (2’) and 
(3’)).  The results from these regressions are given in Table 6.  As shown, the evidence for 
political monetary cycles is still present with the restricted sample and the additional CBI 
variable.  The positive interaction term in specification (3’) indicates that a more legally 
independent central bank is able to mitigate the effect of election cycles on money growth.  The 
OLS coefficient of EC1*CBI has the correct sign but is insignificant.    
 Third, we include all presidential and parliamentary elections for each country to 
construct our election cycle variable, as opposed to including only elections for the national 
leader.  For the most part, this involves including parliamentary elections in presidential systems.  
Parliamentary elections may still be relevant in a presidential system, albeit less than presidential 
elections, since a president may want to pressure the central bank to expand output to help 
his/her own party get elected.  As shown in Table 7, we still detect the presence of political 
monetary cycles although the results are slightly weaker.  This confirms our intuition that in 
presidential systems, parliamentary elections cause less severe monetary cycles than presidential 
elections.  
 Fourth, we restrict observations to periods when countries had a democracy index greater 
than or equal to 3, thereby excluding elections that are listed as “not free” in IDEA 
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International.13  We find stronger evidence of political monetary cycles in this case.  For 
example, for the typical developing economy, M1 growth is 34.8 percentage points higher during 
elections relative to non-election periods, as opposed to the 24.3 percentage points we find 
without this restriction.  This result suggests that the need to stimulate the economy during 
elections is greater in democracies where election outcomes are more uncertain.   
 
4. Ranking Central Bank Independence  
 In this section, we construct our ranking of CBI using the following regression:   
( )
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where COUNTRYi is a dummy variable that takes on the value one for the ith country and zero 
otherwise.  By interacting EC with COUNTRYi, we create a separate election cycle variable for 
each country and allow the coefficients for these election cycle variables, iβ , to differ across 
countries.  The value of these coefficients signify the extent to which political monetary cycles 
are present in each country, and therefore how dependent the central bank of each country is in 
conducting monetary policy.  We use these coefficients as the CBI score for each country, with 
lower scores indicating greater independence.  
 There are several points to emphasize about this specification.  First, we use pooled OLS 
as opposed to a FE model to avoid the problem of limited within-country variation in FXR and 
DEM, although FE estimation yields fairly similar results.  Second, DEV is not used in this 
                                                 
13 IDEA International’s Voter Turnout database uses the average of the PR and CL indexes of Freedom House to 
designate the elections in its database as free, partly-free or not free.  Elections with a score below 3 (i.e. above 5 
without inverting the data as we did) are designated as not free. 
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regression because it partially captures CBI.  However, the omitted variable bias is negligible 
since the correlation of DEV with each of the EC*COUNTRY dummies is very small.  In fact, the 
ranking is virtually identical when we include DEV.  Third, EC*DEV drops out due to perfect 
multicollinearity once EC*COUNTRY is added to the regression.   
 Fourth, we use common coefficients for the control variables instead of allowing for 
different coefficients for each country.  The reason is that FXR and DEM have little, and for 
some countries, no within-country variation.  As explained in section 2, EC*FXR is an important 
control variable since a country with a fixed exchange rate regime may experience weaker 
political monetary cycles, not necessarily because its central bank is independent, but because 
the fixed exchange rate regime restricts political meddling in monetary policy.  Similarly, 
EC*DEM is an important control variable since a country with a low level of democracy may 
experience weaker political monetary cycles, not necessarily because its central bank is 
independent, but because autocratic rulers feel less of a need to intervene during elections.  If we 
had allowed the coefficients of these interaction terms to differ by country (i.e. used 
EC*COUNTRY*FXR and EC*COUNTRY*DEM), the interaction terms would have dropped out 
for countries with no within-country variation and their effects would have been captured in 
EC*COUNTRY, confounding the interpretation of the country-by-country election cycle 
coefficients.  For example, a country with little CBI but a fixed exchange rate throughout the 
sample period would receive a better CBI score than it should because of similar money growth 
during elections vs. non-election periods.  Since it is important to include interaction terms with 
FXR and DEM as controls, we proceed not with a country-by-country interaction effect, but with 
an effect that is common for all countries.  For simplicity and to parallel our method for FXR and 
DEM, we use common coefficients for all control variables including the lags of money growth.  
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One problem with using common factors, however, is that the ranking can change depending on 
the sample of countries.   
 Table 8 ranks the 115 countries in our sample according to their CBI score generated 
from equation (2) using EC1 as the election cycle variable.14  As expected, central banks of the 
advanced economies rank higher than most developing countries.  Among the advanced 
economies, only Singapore lies in the bottom half of the ranking.   
There are many countries, including the former Eastern bloc, with limited data and few 
elections.  This may lead to unreliable estimates.  We therefore limit our sample to countries with 
at least 20 years of data and three elections between 1972 and 2001, which yields 55 countries.  
We then re-estimate the model to generate a new ranking.15  This ranking resembles closely the 
ranking from Table 8 when we restrict that ranking to these 55 countries (i.e., when we simply 
delete countries from Table 8 and re-number the ranking).  The results are shown in Table 9.  
The average difference in the two rankings is 1.3 with a maximum difference of five for Guyana.   
This suggests that the rankings are not sensitive to adding or dropping countries with few data 
points from our sample. 
Similarly, we restrict the sample period to 1980-2001 and generate a new ranking for 
these 55 countries.  This ranking is highly correlated with the unrestricted ranking, with a 
correlation coefficient of 0.94.  The average difference in the two rankings is 3.9 with a 
maximum difference of 19 for Panama.  
 We also use the ranking in Table 8 and re-rank using only the 60 countries common to 
both our sample and that of Cukierman, et al. (1992).  The two ordinal rankings are highly 
correlated with a correlation of 0.63.  This correlation between the two rankings, which are based 
                                                 
14 Note that the smaller the CBI score, the more independent the central bank. 
15 The results in Section 3 did not change significantly using this restricted sample.  
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on entirely different characteristics of central banks, provides further credibility to both rankings 
and additional robustness to results of the impact of CBI that rely on the earlier ranking. 
Finally, we compare each country’s election cycle coefficient against its average inflation 
rate between 1972 and 2001.  As expected, countries with higher CBI tend to have lower average 
inflation rates with a correlation of -0.62.        
 
5. Conclusion 
 Our first goal in this paper is to expand the analysis of election-induced monetary cycles.  
Existing research has not come to a definitive conclusion on the existence of political monetary 
cycles in advanced economies.  Our results are consistent with studies that have not found a 
significant effect.  More importantly, however, we break with the literature by analyzing 
developing economies where these cycles are more likely to occur.  We find strong evidence of 
political monetary cycles in these countries.  The findings in this paper, therefore, underscore the 
importance of CBI in conducting monetary policy.  The evidence for developing economies that 
political monetary cycles do indeed exist makes a strong case for reforming the relationship 
between the monetary and fiscal authorities in these countries.  In addition, we confirm that CBI 
is negatively correlated with inflation, not just during election cycles.   
 Second, we contribute to the empirical literature exploring the role of CBI by 
constructing a ranking of CBI that does not rely on legal measures of independence or turnover 
rates of central bank governors.  We argue that one of the main explanations for cross-country 
variation in the severity of political monetary cycles is the degree of CBI.  Based on this 
intuition, we estimate the impact of election cycles on M1 growth in each country and use cross-
country variation in the election cycle coefficients to generate a de facto ranking of CBI.  Our 
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ranking of CBI is therefore based on the behavior of central banks during election cycles when 
their independence is likely to be challenged or their lack of independence is likely to be 
revealed.    
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
All Observations obs. mean median s.d. min max
M1 Growth 10,175 38.60 14.35 374.98 -50.13 23,470.40
Election Quarter 10,175 0.05 0 0.22 0 1
EC1 10,175 0.42 0 0.49 0 1
EC2 10,175 0.24 0 0.43 0 1
EC3 10,175 0.59 1 0.49 0 1
EC4 10,175 0.43 0 0.49 0 1
DEV 10,175 0.74 1 0.44 0 1
DEM 10,175 4.66 5 1.86 1 7
FXR 10,175 0.32 0 0.46 0 1
GOVEXP 10,175 15.55 14.58 6.11 2.90 64.39
GROWTH 10,175 3.43 3.66 4.70 -42.45 39.49
Advanced Countries obs. mean median s.d. min max
M1 Growth 2,604 12.08 10.12 12.35 -28.94 202.46
Election Quarter 2,604 0.07 0 0.26 0 1
EC1 2,604 0.60 1 0.49 0 1
EC2 2,604 0.35 0 0.48 0 1
EC3 2,604 0.82 1 0.39 0 1
EC4 2,604 0.60 1 0.49 0 1
DEM 2,604 6.46 7 1.12 2 7
FXR 2,604 0.20 0 0.40 0 1
GOVEXP 2,604 17.99 18 4.37 8.32 29.94
GROWTH 2,604 3.33 3.19 2.92 -6.85 13.44
Developing Countries obs. mean median s.d. min max
M1 Growth 7,571 47.72 16.80 434.28 -50.13 23,470.40
Election Quarter 7,571 0.04 0 0.20 0 1
EC1 7,571 0.36 0 0.48 0 1
EC2 7,571 0.21 0 0.40 0 1
EC3 7,571 0.52 1 0.50 0 1
EC4 7,571 0.37 0 0.48 0 1
DEM 7,571 4.04 4 1.65 1.00 7.00
FXR 7,571 0.36 0 0.48 0 1
GOVEXP 7,571 14.72 13.28 6.39 2.90 64.39
GROWTH 7,571 3.47 3.94 5.18 -42.45 39.49  
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Table 1a: Summary Statistics by Election Cycle
All Observations obs. mean median s.d. min. max.
EC1 =0 M1 Growth 5,879 26.74 15.19 147.41 -45.18 9,629.34
DEV 5,879 0.82 1 0.38 0 1
DEM 5,879 4.10 4 1.88 1 7
FXR 5,879 0.36 0 0.48 0 1
GOVEXP 5,879 15.20 14.08 6.19 2.90 64.39
GROWTH 5,879 3.49 3.72 5.22 -42.45 39.49
EC1 =1 M1 Growth 4,296 54.82 13.20 550.35 -50.13 23,470.40
DEV 4,296 0.63 1 0.48 0 1
DEM 4,296 5.43 6 1.53 1 7
FXR 4,296 0.25 0 0.43 0 1
GOVEXP 4,296 16.04 15.28 5.96 2.90 45.96
GROWTH 4,296 3.35 3.58 3.88 -30.90 38.20
Advanced Countries obs. mean median s.d. min. max.
EC1 =0 M1 Growth 1,033 12.02 10.41 10.33 -11.78 75.55
DEM 1,033 6.23 7 1.38 2 7
FXR 1,033 0.22 0 0.42 0 1
GOVEXP 1,033 17.50 18.11 4.57 8.32 29.94
GROWTH 1,033 3.64 3.30 3.13 -3.94 12.03
EC1 =1 M1 Growth 1,571 12.12 9.87 13.52 -28.94 202.46
DEM 1,571 6.62 7 0.87 2 7
FXR 1,571 0.18 0 0.38 0 1
GOVEXP 1,571 18.31 18.35 4.21 9.18 29.94
GROWTH 1,571 3.12 3.13 2.76 -6.85 13.44
Developing Countries obs. mean median s.d. min. max.
EC1 =0 M1 Growth 4,846 29.88 16.99 162.13 -45.18 9,629.34
DEM 4,846 3.65 4 1.65 1 7
FXR 4,846 0.39 0 0.49 0 1
GOVEXP 4,846 14.71 13.34 6.37 2.90 64.39
GROWTH 4,846 3.46 3.93 5.57 -42.45 39.49
EC1 =1 M1 Growth 2,725 79.44 16.41 689.78 -50.13 23,470.40
DEM 2,725 4.75 5 1.41 1 7
FXR 2,725 0.30 0 0.46 0 1
GOVEXP 2,725 14.73 13.19 6.42 2.90 45.96
GROWTH 2,725 3.48 3.97 4.40 -30.90 38.20
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Table 2: Results from Pooled and Fixed Effects Estimation (using EC1 = T-4,T+4)
Dependent variable: Pooled OLS FE
M1 Growth (%) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
EC1 19.106 20.845 -17.490 24.684 24.434 -35.734
(2.45)** (2.52)** (1.300) (4.47)*** (4.42)*** (1.170)
DEV 12.313 -2.767
(2.33)** (0.420)
FXR -5.872 -7.136 -1.136 0.438
(0.580) (1.290) (0.130) (0.040)
GOVEXP -0.251 -0.222 0.501 0.399
(0.570) (0.990) (0.630) (0.480)
GROWTH -1.268 0.453 -1.237 0.431
(2.52)** (1.380) (2.14)** (0.650)
EC1*DEV 40.599 52.554
(2.99)*** (3.60)***
EC1*DEM 6.567 10.269
(2.20)** (2.66)***
EC1*FXR 6.090 1.556
(0.390) (0.130)
EC1*GOVEXP -0.408 -0.613
(0.400) (0.630)
EC1*GROWTH -6.205 -6.398
(2.89)*** (5.20)***
Observations 10,175 10,175 10,175 10,167 10,170 10,167
Countries 115 115 115 115 115 115
R 2 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.52 0.52 0.53
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. Coefficients of constant term and lags of M1 growth are not shown. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
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Table 3: Results from Pooled and Fixed Effects Estimation (using EC2 = T-8,T+4)
Dependent variable: Pooled OLS FE
M1 Growth (%) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
EC2 16.478 18.975 -17.083 24.442 24.489 -46.876
(2.43)** (2.54)** (1.600) (4.13)*** (4.12)*** (1.490)
DEV 12.886 -4.294
(2.40)** (0.660)
FXR -5.584 -8.521 -0.509 -1.114
(0.550) (1.440) (0.060) (0.100)
GOVEXP -0.248 -0.364 0.555 0.334
(0.560) (1.240) (0.700) (0.370)
GROWTH -1.298 0.595 -1.265 0.498
(2.56)** (1.71)* (2.19)** (0.680)
EC2*DEV 32.694 49.705
(3.10)*** (2.87)***
EC2*DEM 4.607 9.778
(2.08)** (2.80)***
EC2*FXR 5.500 0.251
(0.450) (0.020)
EC2*GOVEXP 0.030 -0.010
(0.040) (0.010)
EC2*GROWTH -4.682 -4.697
(2.98)*** (4.11)***
Observations 10,175 10,175 10,175 10,170 10,167 10,170
Countries 115 115 115 115 115 115
R 2 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.52 0.52 0.53
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. Coefficients of constant term and lags of M1 growth are not shown. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
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Table 4: Results from Pooled and Fixed Effects Estimation (using EC3 = T-4,T)
Dependent variable: Pooled OLS FE
M1 Growth (%) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
EC3 9.266 9.985 -4.718 10.860 10.667 -4.133
(2.15)** (2.26)** (0.320) (1.79)* (1.76)* (0.120)
DEV 8.958 4.752
(1.65)* (0.880)
FXR -7.232 -3.799 -2.881 1.969
(0.730) (0.340) (0.330) (0.210)
GOVEXP -0.229 0.034 0.460 0.592
(0.520) (0.060) (0.580) (0.730)
GROWTH -1.275 -0.884 -1.270 -0.947
(2.52)** (1.65)* (2.20)** (1.520)
EC3*DEV 24.217 25.746
(2.36)** (1.630)
EC3*DEM 6.681 7.330
(2.38)** (1.560)
EC3*FXR -13.916 -18.139
(1.510) (1.330)
EC3*GOVEXP -1.576 -1.789
(1.75)* (1.620)
EC3*GROWTH -2.507 -2.394
(1.66)* (1.640)
Observations 10,175 10,175 10,175 10,171 10,169 10,171
Countries 115 115 115 115 115 115
R 2 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.52 0.52 0.52
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. Coefficients of constant term and lags of M1 growth are not shown. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
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Table 5: Results from Pooled and Fixed Effects Estimation (using EC4 = T-8,T)
Dependent variable: Pooled OLS FE
M1 Growth (%) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
EC4 3.760 4.736 -5.503 5.344 5.309 -3.540
(1.210) (1.440) (0.310) (0.970) (0.970) (0.120)
DEV 8.654 4.872
(1.560) (0.960)
FXR -7.342 -4.257 -2.976 2.172
(0.750) (0.330) (0.340) (0.210)
GOVEXP -0.228 0.002 0.456 0.676
(0.510) 0.000 (0.570) (0.810)
GROWTH -1.283 -1.007 -1.283 -1.131
(2.54)** (1.610) (2.22)** (1.66)*
EC4*DEV 13.067 13.997
(1.79)* (0.960)
EC4*DEM 3.494 4.116
(1.92)* (1.100)
EC4*FXR -7.479 -12.233
(0.810) (1.030)
EC4*GOVEXP -0.749 -1.036
(1.000) (1.070)
EC4*GROWTH -1.007 -0.744
(0.980) (0.620)
Observations 10,175 10,175 10,175 10,167 10,171 10,170
Countries 115 115 115 115 115 115
R 2 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.52 0.52 0.52
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. Coefficients of constant term and lags of M1 growth are not shown. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
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Table 6: Results from Pooled and Fixed Effects Estimation (using EC1 ) - Including Cukierman, et al. (1992) Measure of CBI
Dependent variable: Pooled OLS FEa
M1 Growth (%) (2) (2') (3) (3') (3) (3')
EC1 29.865 29.798 -16.164 -13.274 -42.652 -39.139
(2.37)** (2.36)** (0.680) (0.560) (0.850) (0.780)
DEV 18.441 18.790 -12.103 -12.453
(2.58)*** (2.51)** (0.910) (0.890)
FXR -4.567 -4.721 -25.668 -25.496 -17.401 -16.987
(0.310) (0.310) (2.42)** (2.42)** (1.090) (1.070)
CBI -0.470 0.424
(0.820) (0.580)
GOVEXP -0.334 -0.320 -0.786 -0.801 0.659 0.652
(0.410) (0.400) (1.440) (1.460) (0.360) (0.360)
GROWTH -2.605 -2.601 0.823 0.819 0.907 0.911
(2.69)*** (2.69)*** (1.080) (1.090) (0.740) (0.740)
EC1*DEV 68.274 68.842 84.803 85.533
(2.62)*** (2.59)*** (4.11)*** (4.14)***
EC1*DEM 3.552 2.918 8.775 7.958
(0.880) (0.700) (1.320) (1.180)
EC1*FXR 47.161 46.487 39.717 38.826
(1.180) (1.170) (1.92)* (1.87)*
EC1*CBI -2.243 -2.517
(1.75)* (0.640)
EC1*GOVEXP 0.798 0.886 0.559 0.681
(0.460) (0.500) (0.340) (0.410)
EC1*GROWTH -9.699 -9.692 -10.087 -10.070
(2.76)*** (2.76)*** (5.04)*** (5.03)***
Observations 6,029 6,029 6,029 6,029 6,029 6,029
Countries 60 60 60 60 60 60
R 2 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.51 0.51
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. Coefficients of constant term and lags of M1 growth are not shown. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
a. We do not present specification (2) and (2)' for FE because CBI is time-invariant and therefore drops out of the estimation. 
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Table 7: Results from Pooled and Fixed Effects Estimation (using EC1 ) - All Elections
Dependent variable: Pooled OLS FE
M1 Growth (%) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
EC1 16.727 18.415 -13.376 20.388 20.332 -33.572
(2.51)** (2.56)** (1.100) (3.71)*** (3.69)*** (1.150)
DEV 12.182 -3.514
(2.29)** (0.490)
FXR -5.816 -5.807 -1.996 1.044
(0.580) (0.840) (0.230) (0.100)
GOVEXP -0.177 -0.308 0.577 0.232
(0.400) (1.430) (0.730) (0.270)
GROWTH -1.280 0.636 -1.232 0.596
(2.54)** (1.510) (2.13)** (0.870)
EC1*DEV 34.288 44.020
(2.99)*** (3.01)***
EC1*DEM 5.227 8.042
(1.93)* (2.24)**
EC1*FXR 2.282 -2.244
(0.230) (0.190)
EC1*GOVEXP -0.129 0.122
(0.120) (0.130)
EC1*GROWTH -5.738 -5.957
(3.00)*** (5.07)***
Observations 10,175 10,175 10,175 10,168 10,167 10,169
Countries 115 115 115 115 115 115
R 2 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.52 0.52 0.53
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. Coefficients of constant term and lags of M1 growth are not shown. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
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Table 8: CBI Ranking - Full Sample of 115 Countries
Ranking Country Ranking Country Ranking Country
1 Sweden 40 Portugal 79 Togo
2 Denmark 41 Costa Rica 80 Cote d'Ivoire
3 Netherlands 42 Croatia 81 Kenya
4 Dominica 43 Greece 82 Georgia
5 Estonia 44 Hungary 83 Thailand
6 France 45 Malta 84 Gabon
7 Czech Republic 46 Panama 85 Tunisia
8 Belgium 47 Venezuela 86 Pakistan
9 Austria 48 Bulgaria 87 Nepal
10 Suriname 49 Botswana 88 Guatemala
11 United Kingdom 50 Ecuador 89 Turkey
12 Israel 51 Antigua and Barbuda 90 Sri Lanka
13 Poland 52 Korea 91 Malaysia
14 Canada 53 Philippines 92 Ghana
15 Germany 54 Ukraine 93 Haiti
16 New Zealand 55 Malawi 94 Kyrgyz Republic
17 Norway 56 Mauritius 95 Mauritania
18 Slovak Republic 57 Honduras 96 Algeria
19 Latvia 58 Romania 97 Zimbabwe
20 Lithuania 59 Gambia 98 Tanzania
21 Australia 60 Lesotho 99 Russia
22 South Africa 61 Senegal 100 Albania
23 Italy 62 Burundi 101 Lebanon
24 Finland 63 Colombia 102 Belarus
25 Iceland 64 Niger 103 Paraguay
26 United States 65 Benin 104 Azerbaijan
27 Ireland 66 Armenia 105 Iran
28 Moldova 67 Zambia 106 Uganda
29 Switzerland 68 Chile 107 Singapore
30 Spain 69 India 108 Chad
31 Macedonia, FYR 70 El Salvador 109 Guinea
32 Slovenia 71 Mexico 110 Kazakhstan
33 Jamaica 72 Burkina Faso 111 Bolivia
34 Guyana 73 Morocco 112 Peru
35 Japan 74 Madagascar 113 Argentina
36 Grenada 75 Cameroon 114 Brazil
37 Mongolia 76 Nigeria 115 Nicaragua
38 Uruguay 77 Mali
39 Luxembourg 78 Dominican Republic  
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Table 9: CBI Ranking - Restricted Sample of 55 Countries
Restricted Sample Ranking Full Sample Ranking limited to Restricted Sample Countries
Ranking Country Ranking Country
1 Denmark 1 Denmark
2 Netherlands 2 Netherlands
3 Suriname 3 Austria
4 Israel 4 Suriname
5 Austria 5 United Kingdom
6 United Kingdom 6 Israel
7 Germany 7 Canada
8 New Zealand 8 Germany
9 Canada 9 New Zealand
10 Norway 10 Norway
11 Australia 11 Australia
12 Finland 12 Italy
13 Italy 13 Finland
14 Iceland 14 Iceland
15 Guyana 15 United States
16 United States 16 Ireland
17 Spain 17 Switzerland
18 Ireland 18 Spain
19 Switzerland 19 Jamaica
20 Jamaica 20 Guyana
21 Uruguay 21 Japan
22 Japan 22 Grenada
23 Grenada 23 Uruguay
24 Greece 24 Portugal
25 Panama 25 Costa Rica
26 Portugal 26 Greece
27 Costa Rica 27 Malta
28 Malta 28 Panama
29 Venezuela 29 Venezuela
30 Ecuador 30 Botswana
31 Botswana 31 Ecuador
32 Gambia 32 Mauritius
33 Honduras 33 Honduras
34 Senegal 34 Gambia
35 Mauritius 35 Senegal
36 Colombia 36 Colombia
37 Morocco 37 India
38 Mexico 38 El Salvador
39 El Salvador 39 Mexico
40 India 40 Morocco
41 Madagascar 41 Madagascar
42 Dominican Republic 42 Dominican Republic
43 Pakistan 43 Thailand
44 Turkey 44 Pakistan
45 Thailand 45 Nepal
46 Guatemala 46 Guatemala
47 Nepal 47 Turkey
48 Sri Lanka 48 Sri Lanka
49 Malaysia 49 Malaysia
50 Paraguay 50 Paraguay
51 Singapore 51 Singapore
52 Bolivia 52 Bolivia
53 Peru 53 Peru
54 Argentina 54 Argentina
55 Nicaragua 55 Nicaragua  
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Table A1: Variables and Data Sources
Variable Description and Source
M % change in M1 (variable 34 from the IFS) from 4 quarters before. 
Election Quarter Leader Quarterly Data. Used to generate the election cycle variable EC . Takes on the 
value 1 if there was an election for the national leader. Sources listed below.  
DEV 0 for advanced, 1 for developing or emerging economy based on the 
classification in Arnone, et al. (2007).
DEM Average of Political Rights and Civil Liberties. The order of variables reversed so 
that 1 is low democracy and 7 is high.  Source: Freedom House.  
FXR 1 for fixed exchange rate regime and 0 otherwise based on Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2003) course classification.
GOVEXP General government final consumption expenditure (% of GDP). Source: WDI. 
NE.CON.GOVT.ZS
GROWTH GDP growth (annual %). Source: WDI. NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG
CBI Cukierman, et al. (1992)’s overall index of CBI for the 1980's, constructed from 
their measures of central bank governor turnover and legal measures of 
independence.
Sources:
http://www.idea.int/vt/country_view.cfm
http://africanelections.tripod.com
http://www.electionresources.org/
http://cdp.binghamton.edu/era/index.html
http://www.electionguide.org/
http://www.wikipedia.org/
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Table A2: Countries
Albania Greece New Zealand
Algeria Grenada Nicaragua
Antigua and Barbuda Guatemala Niger
Argentina Guinea Nigeria
Armenia Guyana Norway
Australia Haiti Pakistan
Austria Honduras Panama
Azerbaijan Hungary Paraguay
Belarus Iceland Peru
Belgium India Philippines
Benin Iran Poland
Bolivia Ireland Portugal
Botswana Israel Romania
Brazil Italy Russia
Bulgaria Jamaica Senegal
Burkina Faso Japan Singapore
Burundi Kazakhstan Slovak Republic
Cameroon Kenya Slovenia
Canada Korea South Africa
Chad Kyrgyz Republic Spain
Chile Latvia Sri Lanka
Colombia Lebanon Suriname
Costa Rica Lesotho Sweden
Cote d'Ivoire Lithuania Switzerland
Croatia Luxembourg Tanzania
Czech Republic Macedonia, FYR Thailand
Denmark Madagascar Togo
Dominica Malawi Tunisia
Dominican Republic Malaysia Turkey
Ecuador Mali Uganda
El Salvador Malta Ukraine
Estonia Mauritania United Kingdom
Finland Mauritius United States
France Mexico Uruguay
Gabon Moldova Venezuela
Gambia Mongolia Zambia
Georgia Morocco Zimbabwe
Germany Nepal
Ghana Netherlands  
